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Abstract
Lately, so-called “quantum” models, based on parts of the mathematics of quantum
mechanics, have been developed in decision theory and cognitive sciences to account
for seemingly irrational or paradoxical human judgments. We consider here some such
quantum-like models that address question order effects, i.e. cases in which given
answers depend on the order of presentation of the questions. Models of various
dimensionalities could be used; can the simplest ones be empirically adequate? From
the quantum law of reciprocity, we derive new empirical predictions that we call the
Grand Reciprocity equations, that must be satisfied by several existing quantum-like
models, in their non-degenerate versions. Using substantial existing data sets, we show
that these non-degenerate versions fail the GR test in most cases, which means that,
if quantum-like models of the kind considered here are to work, it can only be in their
degenerate versions. However, we suggest that the route of degenerate models is not
necessarily an easy one, and we argue for more research on the empirical adequacy of
degenerate quantum-like models in general.
Keywords: question order effect; quantum model; quantum-like model; non-degenerate
model; law of reciprocity; double stochasticity; empirical adequacy
“Research is needed which designs tests of quantum properties
such as the law of reciprocity and the law of double stochasticity”
(Busemeyer and Bruza 2012, 342)
1 Introduction
In decision theory and in cognitive sciences, classical cognitive models of judgment
rely on Bayesian probabilities and suppose that agents’ decisions or choices are guided by
preferences or attitudes that are determined at any time. Yet, various empirical results
have threatened the predictive and explanatory power of these classical models: human
judgments display order effects — the answers given to two questions depend on the order
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of presentation of these questions (Schuman and Presser 1981, Tourangeau, Ribs and
Rasinski 2000, Moore 2002) —, conjunction fallacies — someone is judged less likely to
have characteristic C than characteristics C and D (Tversky and Kahneman 1982 and
1983, Gavanski and Roskos-Ewoldsen 1991, Stolarz-Fantino et al. 2003) —, violate the
sure-thing principle — stating that preferring X to Y given any possible state of the world
should imply preferring X to Y when the exact state of the world is not known (Allais
1953, Ellsberg 1961, Shafir and Tversky 1992) —, or asymmetries in similarity — X is
judged more similar to Y than Y to X (Tversky 1977, Krumhansl 1978, Ashby and Perrin
1988). In the classical cognitive framework, these behaviors have often been dubbed as
irrational or paradoxical.
Recently, a research field that rely on so-called “quantum” or “quantum-like” models
has developed to account for such behaviors. The qualifier “quantum” is used to indicate
that the models exploit the mathematics of a contemporary physical theory, quantum
mechanics. Note that only some mathematical tools of quantum mechanics are employed,
and that the claim is not that these models are justified by an application of quantum
physics to the brain. For that reason, we shall prefer to call them “quantum-like” models.
Such models put into question two classical characteristics recalled above: they abandon
Bayesian probabilities for others which are similar to probabilities in quantum mechanics,
and they allow for preferences or attitudes to be undetermined. Quantum-like models
have received much interest from psychologists, physicists, economists, cognitive scientists
and philosophers. For example, new theoretical frameworks have been proposed in decision
theory and bounded rationality (Danilov and Lambert-Mogiliansky 2008 and 2010, Yukalov
and Sornette 2011).
Various quantum-like models have been proposed to account for any of the seemingly
paradoxical behaviors recalled above (for reviews, see Pothos and Busemeyer 2013, Ash-
tiani and Azgomi 2015). First, as the mathematics involved in quantum mechanics are
well-known for their non-commutative features, one of their natural application is the ac-
count of question order effects. For instance, Wang and Busemeyer (2009) and Wang et
al. (2014) offer a general quantum-like model for attitude questions that are asked in
polls. Conte et al. (2009) present a model for mental states of visual perception, and
Atmanspacher and Ro¨mer (2012) discuss non-commutativity. Quantum-like models have
also been offered to explain the conjunction fallacy. For instance, Franco (2009) argues
that it can be recovered from interference effects, which are central features in quantum
mechanics and at the origin of the violation of classical probabilities. Busemeyer et al.
(2011) present a quantum-like model that could explain conjunction fallacy from some or-
der effects. The violation of the sure thing principle has also been investigated by means of
quantum-like models. Busemeyer, Wang and Townsend (2006), and Busemeyer and Wang
(2007) use quantum formalism to explain this violation by introducing probabilistic inter-
ference and superposition of states. Khrennikov and Haven (2009) also explain Ellsberg’s
paradox, and Aerts et al. (2011) model the Hawaii problem. Lambert-Mogiliansky et al.
(2009) offer a model for the indeterminacy of preferences. Dynamical models, that rely on
a time evolution of the mental state, have also been introduced (Pothos and Busemeyer
2009, Busemeyer et al. 2009, and Trueblood and Busemeyer 2011). Several other empirical
features, such as asymmetry judgments in similarity have also been offered a quantum-like
model (Pothos and Busemeyer, 2011).
We shall concentrate in this paper on one kind of quantum-like models, those which
claim to account for question order effect — that answers depend on the order in which
questions are asked. We choose these models because (i) order effect is a straightforward
application of the non-commutative mathematics from quantum mechanics, (ii) order effect
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models are perhaps the simplest ones and (iii) some of them are at the roots of other models.
All quantum-like models for order effect are not identical. Yet, several of them are built
along the same lines, as in Conte et al. (2009), Busemeyer et al. (2009), Busemeyer et
al. (2011), Atmanspacher and Ro¨mer (2012), Pothos and Busemeyer (2013), Wang and
Busemeyer (2013) and Wang et al. (2014). We choose to focus here on this kind of models
for order effect (to be characterized, at least partly, in Section 2). So, we do not consider
for instance the model in Aerts, Gabora and Sozzo (2013) that rely on different hypotheses,
or a quantum-like model for order effect in inference that can be found in Trueblood and
Busemeyer (2011) or in Busemeyer et al. (2011). Our analyses only bear on the previously
mentioned kind of models.
When such quantum-like models for order effects were proposed, empirical adequacy
was cared about: it was argued that the models were able to account either for existing
empirical data (e.g. Wang and Busemeyer 2013 for the data from Moore 2002, Wang et
al. 2014 for data from around 70 national surveys) or for data from new experiments (e.g.
Conte et al. 2009, Wang and Busemeyer 2013). This is not all: a supplementary a priori
constraint (the “QQ equality”) has been derived and it has been successfully verified on
the above-mentioned data (Wang and Busemeyer 2013, Wang et al. 2014). So, it seems
that quantum-like models for question order effects are well verified and can be considered
as adequate, at least for a vast set of experiments.
However, some details remain to be settled. In many cases, the above-referred papers
do not specify exactly which model, with which parameters, is to account for the data in
this or thus order effect situation. In particular, when it is claimed that some data can be
accounted for by a quantum-like model, the dimensionality of the model is often not spec-
ified, and the most general case is assumed: the model is supposed to be N dimensional,
and the answers to the questions can be represented by subspaces of any dimension. This
encompasses two cases: either the answers are represented by 1-D subspaces, in which
case the model is said to be non-degenerate, or the answers are represented by subspaces
of larger dimensions, in which case the model is said to be degenerate. The papers do
not always specify whether the model that is to account for the data can remain simple
and be non-degenerate, or has to be degenerate — this is a question of theoretical im-
portance, as we shall argue. The quantum-like literature is inclined to favor degenerate
models, insisting on the high-dimensionality of the space and on the complexity of the
experimental situation to be modeled, and often considers non-degenerate models as toy
models and use them for illustrative purposes only1. So, the question of choosing between
non-degenerate and degenerate models on an empirical basis has not been fully dealt with,
and it remains unclear so far whether the simple non-degenerate version of the models
could be empirically adequate. Is there a simple way to test whether a non-degenerate
version of the quantum-like models is sufficient to account for some order effect data?
The present paper argues that this question can receive a positive answer. We show that
the non-degenerate versions of the quantum-like models under consideration can actually
be empirically tested in another unstudied — although simple — way, that bears on
data that were not intended to be explained but that are nevertheless predicted by the
models. After reconstructing a non-degenerate quantum-like version of a model for order
effect (Section 2), we derive from the quantum law of reciprocity a set of constraints
for it that we call the Grand Reciprocity (GR) equations (Section 3). In Section 4, we
1For instance, in Busemeyer and Bruza (2012), the non-degenerate model is presented as “a simple
example” (p. 100) or as “much too simple” (p. 108), before the general model, which is degenerate, is
presented. That non-degenerate models are “toy models” is also what suggest Busemeyer et al. 2015 p.
240, albeit for quantum-like models for the conjunction fallacy. An exception towards degeneracy is Conte
et al. (2009), one of the first papers in the field, which only considers non-degenerate models.
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argue that the non-degenerate versions of the models that can be found in Conte et al.
(2009), Busemeyer and Bruza (2012), Pothos and Busemeyer (2013), Wang and Busemeyer
(2013) and Wang et al. (2014), have to obey the GR equations — note that these papers,
except for Conte et al. (2009), also consider degenerate versions of the models, that are
not required to obey the GR equations, and thus will not be tested here. Using only
available data and without carrying out any new experiment, we are able to put the GR
equations to the test (Section 5). We show that a vast majority of empirical cases fail
to satisfy the GR equations, which means that the non-degenerate versions of the above-
mentioned models cannot account for these cases. In other words, if the quantum-like
models that have been proposed are indeed to work, it cannot be in the special case of
their non-degenerate versions, as the authors themselves had rightly anticipated, and the
data should be accounted for with degenerate models. In Section 6, we suggest however
that the route of degenerate models is not necessarily an easy one, and we argue for more
research on the empirical adequacy of models in general. Overall, the positive conclusion of
our results, we suggest, is that research on quantum-like models for question order effect
should be directed towards degenerate models, both as a consequence of the failure of
non-degenerate ones and in order to find generalizations of the GR equations that should
enable to empirically test them. This paper is the first one to challenge non-degenerate
models for order effect and to show that they cannot be used as such in many cases. Our
work puts warnings about the future use of these specific models, and provides a critical
and constructive look at quantum models of cognition.
2 A general non-degenerate quantum-like model for ques-
tion order effect
As indicated in the introduction, we are concerned here with the following quantum-
like models for order effect: Conte et al. (2009), Busemeyer et al. (2009), Busemeyer et
al. (2011), Atmanspacher and Ro¨mer (2012), Pothos and Busemeyer (2013), Wang and
Busemeyer (2013) and Wang et al. (2014). As they are more or less built along the same
lines, we choose for simplicity to present in this section one simple and general model,
which sets the notations and on which all the discussions will be made. A crucial point is
this: these models, except for Conte et al. (2009), are quite general and can be degenerate
or non-degenerate, as already noted. As we shall be concerned here with testing their
non-degenerate versions only, as a special case, the model we present in this section is
non-degenerate. In Section 4, we shall discuss in detail how this model is included in the
models from the above list.
The model is about the beliefs of a person, about which dichotomous yes-no questions
can be asked, for instance “is Clinton honest?”. A vector space on the complex numbers
is introduced to represent the beliefs of the agent, and the answers to the questions. In
the model, two dichotomous questions A and B are posed successively to an agent, in
the order A-then-B or B-then-A. Answer “yes” (respectively “no”) to A is represented
by the vector |a0〉 (respectively |a1〉), and similarly for B, with vectors |b0〉 (respectively)
|b1〉. It is important to note that an answer is supposed to be represented by a vector (or
more exactly, see below, by the ray defined by this vector), and not by a plane or by any
subspace of dimension greater than 1. Since there are no other possible answers to question
A (respectively B) than 0 and 1, the set (|a0〉, |a1〉) (respectively (|b0〉, |b1〉)) forms a basis
of the vector space of possible answers, and the vector space is thus of dimension 2. Note
that it is the same vector space that is used to represents answers to questions A and B;
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Figure 1: [Left:] The basis vectors |b0〉 and |b1〉 can be decomposed on the other basis
vectors |a0〉 and |a1〉, so as to be expressed as in eq. 1 and 2. The scalar products are
either equal to cos δ or to sin δ. [Right:] The state vector |ψ〉 can be expressed in the two
orthonormal bases (|a0〉, |a1〉) and (|b0〉, |b1〉). These figures assume the special case of a
Hilbert space on real numbers.
this space just has two different bases.2
The vector space is supposed to be equipped with a scalar product, thus becoming a
Hilbert space: for two vectors |x〉 and |y〉, the scalar product 〈x|y〉 is a complex number;
its complex conjugate, 〈x|y〉∗, is just 〈y|x〉. The Hilbert space is on the complex numbers,
and vectors can be multiplied by any complex number.3 The basis (|a0〉, |a1〉) is supposed
to be orthonormal, i.e. 〈a0|a1〉 = 0 and 〈a0|a0〉 = 〈a1|a1〉 = 1; similarly for B. Note that
there exists a correspondence between the two bases (cf. figure 1 left):
|b0〉 = 〈a0|b0〉|a0〉+ 〈a1|b0〉|a1〉, (1)
|b1〉 = 〈a0|b1〉|a0〉+ 〈a1|b1〉|a1〉, (2)
and similarly for |a0〉 and |a1〉 expressed as a function of |b0〉 and |b1〉.
An agent’s beliefs about the subject matter of the questions A and B are represented
by a normalized belief state |ψ〉 from this vector space (|〈ψ|ψ〉|2 = 1). It is supposed to
gather all the relevant information to predict her behavior in the situation (like in orthodox
quantum mechanics). |ψ〉 can be expressed in the basis (|a0〉, |a1〉) as
|ψ〉 = α0|a0〉+ α1|a1〉, (3)
with (α0, α1) ∈ C2 (cf. fig. 1 right). It can also be expressed in the basis (|b0〉, |b1〉) as
|ψ〉 = β0|b0〉+ β1|b1〉, (4)
with (β0, β1) ∈ C2, and with an appropriate correspondence between the coefficients.
The belief state |ψ〉 determines the answer in a probabilistic way, and changes only
when a question is answered, according to the following rules:
2In the literature, questions that can be represented in this way are known as “incompatible”. “Com-
patible” questions have a common basis, but the model is then equivalent to a classical one, and there is
nothing quantum about it. Cf. for instance Busemeyer and Bruza (2012, 32–34).
3We consider here this general case. In the literature, some quantum-like models consider a real Hilbert
space, in which scalar products are real numbers, and vectors can be multiplied by real numbers only.
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• Born’s rule: the probability for the agent to answer xi (i = 0, 1) to question X
(X = A,B) is given by the squared modulus of the scalar product between |ψ〉 and
|xi〉:
Pr(xi) = |〈xi|ψ〉|2 (5)
• projection postulate: the agent’s belief state just after the answer xi is the normalized
projection of her belief state prior to the question onto the vector |xi〉 corresponding
to her answer:
|ψ〉 7−→ 〈xi|ψ〉|〈xi|ψ〉| |xi〉. (6)
For instance, if an agent is described by the state vector |ψ〉 = α0|a0〉 + α1|a1〉, the
probability that she answers i to question A is given by |αi|2, in which case the state
after the answer is αi|αi| |ai〉. In fig. 1, this probability can be obtained by first orthogonally
projecting |ψ〉 on the basis vector corresponding to the answer, and then taking the square
of this length. A consequence of the projection postulate in this model is that, just after
an answer i to question X has been given, the state is of the form λ|xi〉 with λ ∈ C and
|λ| = 1. The fact that the state after the answer is equal to |xi〉 “up to a phase factor”, as
one says, is true whatever the state prior to the question. In fig. 1, in the case of a real
Hilbert space, the projection postulates can be interpreted as follow: project |ψ〉 on the
basis vector corresponding to the answer, then normalize it (i.e. expand it so that it gets
a length 1); the result is ±|xi〉, according to the relative orientation of |ψ〉 and |xi〉. In
the general case, answering a question modifies the agent’s state of belief, but there are
exceptions: if an agent’s state of belief is λ|xi〉 (with |λ| = 1), Born’s rule states that she
will answer i (“yes” or “no”) with probability 1, and her state of belief is thus unchanged.
Such vectors from which an answer can be given with certainty are called “eigenvectors”,
and their set is the “eigenspace”, for the “eigenvalue” i. In this model, all eigenspaces are
of dimension 1, and are called “rays” (equivalently, one can say that the eigenvalue is not
degenerate), since it has been supposed that an answer is represented by a vector, and
not by several independent vectors; this will be of decisive importance in the next section.
Another consequence of the projection postulate is that, once an agent has answered i to
question A, she will answer i with probability 1 to the same question A if it is posed again
just afterwards.4
Such a quantum-like model displays order features. Compare for instance p(a0, b0),
the probability to answer 0 to question A and then 0 to question B, and p(b0, a0), the
probability to give the same answers but in the reverse order. To compute p(a0, b0), one
can project the initial state on |a0〉 without normalizing the result, then project the result
on |b0〉, still without normalizing, and take the squared modulus of the final result.5 In
other words, to compare the two probabilities, one can just compare the length of successive
projections of |ψ〉, first on |a0〉 and then |b0〉, or in the reverse order. Figure 2 shows that
they are not necessary equal. Because quantum-like models display these order features, it
has been naturally suggested that they can account for experimentally documented order
effects; Section 4 discusses several such models.
4Of course, this is not true if another question, say B, is posed in-between.
5Proof. Note p(yj |xi) the probability to answer j to question Y given that question X has been
answered with i. After the answer xi, the state is λ|xi〉 with |λ| = 1, so p(yj |xi) = |〈yj |xi〉|2. Note p(xi)
the probability to answer i to question X when this question is asked first. p(a0, b0) = p(a0) · p(b0|a0) =
|〈a0|ψ〉|2 ·|〈b0|a0〉|2 = |〈a0|ψ〉·〈b0|a0〉|2 = |〈b0|a′0〉|2, where |a′0〉 = 〈a0|ψ〉|a0〉. Since |a′0〉 is |ψ〉 projected onto
|a0〉 and not normalized, computing |〈b0|a′0〉|2 means that |a′0〉 is projected onto |b0〉 and not normalized,
before the squared modulus is computed. QED.
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Figure 2: The state vector |ψ〉, projected first on |a0〉 and then on |b0〉, or first on |b0〉
and then on |a0〉, gives different lengths. Consequently, the corresponding probabilities
p(a0, b0) and p(b0, a0) are different.
3 Constraints: the Grand Reciprocity equations
Some general empirical predictions can be derived from the non-degenerate model
presented in the previous section.
3.1 Derivation of the Grand Reciprocity equations
Be xi and yj the answers an agent gives to two successive questions X and Y , in
one order or in the other (X may be equal to Y , and i to j). Because of the projection
postulate, the state just after the answer xi (respectively yj) is λ|xi〉 (respectively λ′|yj〉),
with (λ, λ′) ∈ C2 and |λ| = |λ′| = 1. On the one hand,
p(yj |xi) = |〈yj |(λ|xi〉)|2 = |〈yj |xi〉|2. (7)
On the other hand,
p(xi|yj) = |〈xi|(λ′|yj〉)|2 = |〈xi|yj〉|2. (8)
As indicated previously, 〈yj |xi〉 = 〈xi|yj〉∗, hence |〈yj |xi〉|2 = |〈xi|yj〉|2, and so
p(yj |xi) = p(xi|yj). (9)
This equation is well-known in quantum mechanics, and is called the law of reciprocity
(cf. Peres 1993, p. 35–36 and 56). The only condition for this law is that the eigenvalues
are not degenerate6. It is a quantum law: it is not verified in general by a classical model, in
which P (bj |ai) = P (ai|bj)×P (bj)/P (ai), so P (bj |ai) 6= P (ai|bj) as soon as P (bj) 6= P (ai).
6If the eigenvalues are degenerate, i.e. if the eigenspaces are of dimension greater than 1, then the
projection postulate is generalized in the following way: the agent’s belief state just after the answer xi
is the normalized projection of her belief state prior to the question onto the eigenspace corresponding
to her answer. This eigenspace is the ray spanned by |xi〉 if the eigenvalue is not degenerate, but more
generally it can be a plane or a hyperspace. Here is why the hypothesis of non-degeneracy is necessary to
the reciprocity law. Suppose for simplicity that the Hilbert space is on the real numbers. Suppose that
the eigenspace for the eigenvalue 0 for question A is a ray, while the eigenspace for the eigenvalue 0 for
B is a plane, with an angle pi/4 between them. Once the answer 0 is obtained from question A, the state
vector is on the ray, and if |a0〉 is projected onto the plane, then there is by hypothesis an angle of pi/4,
so p(b0|a0) = cos2(pi/4). Now, once the answer 0 is obtained from question B, the state vector can be
anywhere in the plane, for instance with a right angle to the ray, so p(a0|b0) can be null. The reciprocity
law does not hold anymore.
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For quantum-like models of judgment, the law of reciprocity is somehow well-known7,
but it has not been fully investigated. In the case of our model, it can be instantiated in
the following ways:

p(b0|a0) = p(a0|b0), (10)
p(b1|a0) = p(a0|b1), (11)
p(b0|a1) = p(a1|b0), (12)
p(b1|a1) = p(a1|b1). (13)
For each of these equations, the left member is about questions posed in one sense (A-then-
B), while the right member is about the other sense (B-then-A). This set of equations is
actually equivalent to another set, in which each equation is about one order of questions:

p(b0|a0) = p(b1|a1), (14)
p(a0|b0) = p(a1|b1), (15)
p(b1|a0) = p(b0|a1), (16)
p(a0|b1) = p(a1|b0). (17)
Here’s a proof of the first equation (others are similar): p(b0|a0) = 1−p(b1|a0) because
there are only two possible answers (b0 and b1) to questionB; then 1−p(b1|a0) = 1−p(a0|b1)
because of eq. 11; then 1− p(a0|b1) = p(a1|b1) because there are only two possible answers
to question A; then p(a1|b1) = p(b1|a1) because of eq. 13.
This set of equations 14 to 17 shows that there exist some equations that a quantum-
like model must satisfy even if the questions are not reversed, although the reciprocity
law (eq. 9) is originally about questions in reverse orders. The reciprocity law actually
gives some constraints on one unchanged experimental setup too, when instantiated for
all cases. The equivalence of the two sets of equations (reversing-the-order, eq. 10-13, and
not-reversing-the-order, eq. 14-17) suggests that there is nothing special about equations
which compare reversed orders.
Eq. 14 is equal to eq. 15, because of eq. 10 or 13; similarly for eq. 16 and 17. So, a new
set of equations, that we call the Grand Reciprocity equations, or just the GR equations,
can be written:
 p(b0|a0) = p(a0|b0) = p(b1|a1) = p(a1|b1), (18)p(b1|a0) = p(a0|b1) = p(b0|a1) = p(a1|b0). (19)
This set of equations is equivalent to either of the two previous sets, but it should be
preferred as its form is more explicit. It is also equivalent to the reciprocity law itself,
because it states it for all possible cases in the model. Further, eq. 18 and 19 are equivalent
to one another, because p(y0|xi) + p(y1|xi) = 1 by definition. So, each of these equations
is actually equivalent to the other sets and to the reciprocity law itself.
To the best of our knowledge, these equations have not yet been fully written in the
literature on quantum-like models. Many papers note the law of reciprocity and the
consequences for conditional probabilities (cf. footnote 7), but always for one order of the
questions only.
7Cf. Franco (2009, 417–418), Wang and Busemeyer (2013, 697–698), Busemeyer et al. (2011, 197),
Pothos and Busemeyer (2013, 317), Wang et al. (2014, 5).
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The GR equations set the value for all possible conditional probabilities: among the
eight quantities that can be experimentally measured, there is just one free real parameter.
In the case of a real Hilbert space, the origin of this constraint is to be found in the δ angle
between the two bases (cf. fig. 3).
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Figure 3: A graphical illustration of the Grand Reciprocity equations, in the special case
of a real Hilbert space. A δ angle is enough to define the two orthonormal bases relatively
from one another. Then, conditional probabilities, of the form |〈xi|yj〉|2, are either equal
to cos2(δ) [Left] or to sin2(δ) [Right], with a sum to 1.
3.2 Generalizations
Let us now consider some generalizations of the GR equations to cases which go beyond
the non-degenerate quantum-like model presented in Section 2.
First, the GR equations have been shown for a single agent; by averaging, they ob-
viously still hold for any population of N agents, with various initial state vectors |ψk〉,
with k ∈ {1, ..., N}. Another possible generalization concerns the basis vectors: what if
they depend on the agent k, with |a0,k〉, |a1,k〉, |b0,k〉, |b1,k〉?8 In this case, the above GR
equations can be established for each agent k in the same way as previously, except that
the terms are now indexed for each agent k, in the form pk(x|y) = pk(z|t) (or respectively
= 1− pk(z|t)), with (x, y, z, t) ∈ {a0,k, a1,k, b0,k, b1,k}4. For the whole population, p(x|y) is
now defined by the average of the statistical probabilities pk on all N agents:
p(x|y) = 1
N
Σkpk(x|y), (20)
and similarly for p(z|t). But because for any k, pk(x|y) = pk(z|t), then
1
N
Σkpk(x|y) = 1
N
Σkpk(z|t). (21)
So finally p(x|y) = p(z|t) (or respectively = 1− p(z|t)), and the GR equations hold for the
whole population even if the basis vectors depend on the agent. This is just because it
holds for any agent, and that the average on the agents is a linear operation that enables
to keep the form of the equations.
Also, quantum systems can be described with more general mixed states, instead of
pure states. Here is the difference: |ψ〉 has been supposed to be equal to a vector from
8This situation is considered for instance by Busemeyer et al. 2011 p. 212.
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the Hilbert space, i.e. a pure state, and this supposes that the modeler knows to which
vector the state is equal. But there are cases in which the modeler does not know exactly
to which vector the state is equal (for instance, she only knows that there are 50% chances
that the state is |a0〉, and 50% chances that it is |a1〉). To express this, the belief state is
considered as a statistical ensemble of pure states, and it is represented by a density matrix
(for instance, we write ρ = 0.5|a0〉〈a0| + 0.5|a1〉〈a1| for the above case). The question is
then: are the GR equations valid for pure states only, or also for mixed states? For both,
because no particular hypothesis has been made on the state before the first question is
asked. What matters for the demonstration is the state after the first question, and it
is doomed to be the corresponding eigenvector (up to a phase factor), whether the belief
state was described as a statistical mixture or not before the question was asked. So, the
GR equations hold even if mixed states are assumed, which can prove very powerful.
The GR equations apply to a model with 2 questions with 2 possible answers each, but
one could also consider a larger set of questions. Consider a model with q questions A,
B, C, . . . that are asked in a row, in various orders, each with 2 possible non-degenerate
answers, in a Hilbert space of dimension 2. For the questions considered 2 by 2, the
reciprocity law (eq. 9) holds, since what matters is that answers are represented by 1D
subspaces, and so the GR equations hold too. This gives a set of q · (q−1)/2 GR equations
that this model must satisfy. Consider now a model with 2 questions, each with r possible
answers, with non-degenerate eigenvalues, in a complex Hilbert space of dimension r. The
reciprocity law still holds in this case, and the GR equations hold for each couple of indexes
(i, j) ∈ {1, ..., r}2. Overall, the GR equations can be generalized to apply for models with
q questions and r possible non-degenerate answers.
The hypothesis that eigenvalues are non-degenerate, i.e. that eigenspaces are of dimen-
sion 1, can be relaxed in some cases. Suppose a model M with eigenspaces of dimensions
greater than 1 is empirically equivalent to a model M ′ with eigenspaces of dimension 1.
So to speak, the supplementary dimensions of M are theoretically useless, and empirically
meaningless. As the GR equations hold for M ′, they will also hold for M , to which it is
equivalent. So, more generally, the GR equations hold for models which have eigenspaces
of dimension 1, or which are reducible (i.e. equivalent) to it.
These results may have a larger impact still. Suppose that there exists a set of elemen-
tary questions, the answers of which would be represented by non-degenerate eigenspaces,
i. e. rays. These elementary rays would define the fundamental basis belief states, on
which any belief could be decomposed. The number of such elementary rays would define
the dimensionality of the Hilbert space representing human beliefs. Such an assumption
is widespread in the quantum-like literature. For instance, a similar idea is expressed by
Pothos and Busemeyer about emotions:
“one-dimensional sub-spaces (called rays) in the vector space would correspond to the
most elementary emotions possible. The number of unique elementary emotions and
their relation to each other determine the overall dimensionality of the vector space.
Also, more general emotions, such as happiness, would be represented by subspaces of
higher dimensionality.” (Pothos and Busemeyer 2013, 258).
Generalized GR equations would hold for such elementary questions. Then, all models
with degenerate eigenspaces would just be coarse-grained models, which could be refined
with more elementary questions and rays. For instance, a degenerate answer represented
by a plane combines two elementary dimensions because it fails to distinguish between
them. As a consequence, the meaning of a degenerate answer could be specified through
more specific elementary answers. More importantly, the degenerate model could actually
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be tested on these fundamental questions, with our GR equations or their generalized
versions with q questions and r answers. In other words, if elementary questions existed
— and it seems to be a usual assumption in the quantum-like literature — any model of
the kind presented in Section 2, but with non-degenerate answers or not, could be tested
with GR equations. This is of fantastic interest, as it enables to test any model, and it
has never been noted before. We shall come back on this point in Section 6.
3.3 Link with double stochasticity
Part of the GR equations is actually known in the literature as the requirement of
“double stochasticity”. Let us analyze the links between the two constraints.
Define the change of basis matrix µa,b between the two bases (|a0〉, |a1〉) and (|b0〉, |b1〉),
as:
µa,b =
(〈a0|b0〉 〈a0|b1〉
〈a1|b0〉 〈a1|b1〉
)
. (22)
As the two bases are orthonormal by hypothesis, this matrix is unitary. From it, a transi-
tion matrix T a,b can be defined by T a,bij = |µa,bij |2:
T a,b =
(|〈a0|b0〉|2 |〈a0|b1〉|2
|〈a1|b0〉|2 |〈a1|b1〉|2
)
=
(
p(a0|b0) p(a0|b1)
p(a1|b0) p(a1|b1)
)
. (23)
T a,b contains the probabilities for the answers to question A given the previous answer to
question B (T a,b could be also called TA|B).
Transition matrices are left stochastic: they are square matrices of non-negative real
numbers, of which each column sums to 1. This expresses the fact that, once an answer
has been given to the first question, there is a probability 1 that one of the answers is
given to the second question. A matrix is said to be doubly stochastic in case all columns
and all rows sum to 1. Saying that T a,b is doubly stochasticity amounts to the following
equations: 
p(a0|b0) + p(a1|b0) = 1 (24)
p(a0|b1) + p(a1|b1) = 1 (25)
p(a0|b0) + p(a0|b1) = 1 (26)
p(a1|b0) + p(a1|b1) = 1 (27)
Subtracting these equations one by one gives eq. 15 and 17 — but no more9. So, one gets
one half of the reciprocity relations. This should be no surprise: the double stochasticity
constraint bears on only one experiment, when the order of the questions is the same,
and cannot be informative about the reverse order. It is easy to see that if the double
stochasticity of the reverse transition matrix (T b,a) is assumed, then one gets the other half
of our reciprocity relations (eq. 14 and 16), and then also the GR equations. Conversely,
our GR equations imply double stochasticity for both transition matrices. So, the GR
equations are equivalent to the requirement of double stochasticity for transition matrices
in both senses.
In the literature, double stochasticity is a well-known property of transition matri-
ces for quantum-like non-degenerate models10, but it has generally been required for one
9Eq. 14 and 16 cannot be derived from eq. 24–27: as they bear on questions asked in different orders,
it is easy to imagine a case in which the former are false, whereas the latter are true.
10 Cf. for instance Busemeyer and Bruza (2012, 53–54), Busemeyer, Wang and Lambert-Mogiliansky
(2009), Pothos and Busemeyer (2013, 269).
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transition matrix only (i.e. for questions posed in one order). An exception is Khren-
nikov (2010, 24 and 36), who studies double stochasticity for transition matrices in both
senses, and shows that it must be verified by quantum-like probability models with non-
degenerate eigenvalues, i.e. like in our general model. However, he does not insist on
testing experimentally this property in a systematic way, as we shall do here, with impor-
tant consequences for existing models.
Although the GR equations are equivalent to double stochasticity in both orders for
transition matrices, there are several reasons why the former formulation should be pre-
ferred, both pragmatically and theoretically. To test double stochasticity, one first needs
to write equations like eq. 24–27. But such equations are not independent, so it compli-
cates the statistical tests of significance. Or in order not to test useless equations, some
work needs to be done beforehand to find the independent equations. Actually, untangling
the equations would just lead to the GR equations, which are directly usable. Overall,
the GR equations can be considered as the pragmatic form one should use to test double
stochasticity in both orders. They also clearly show that two set of equations (18 and
19) are equivalent, and that one needs to pick only the corresponding data. Also, the GR
equations show at first sight that there is only one free parameter among all the possi-
ble conditional probabilities, while this is not transparent from the double stochasticity
requirement. More theoretically, the GR equations are directly linked with a central math-
ematical property of the scalar product in the model, making it clear why it holds. On
the other hand, the reason why double stochasticity should hold in this model is more ob-
scure. Finally, the GR equations connect with a fundamental law of quantum mechanics,
namely the law of reciprocity, which helps to understand why it holds only in the case of
non-degenerate eigenvalues, like in quantum mechanics.
3.4 Link with the QQ equality
Wang and Busemeyer (2013) and Wang et al. (2014) defend the test of a relation
called “the QQ equality” that they introduce. This equality holds for the non-degenerate
quantum-like model presented in Section 2, and also if eigenvalues were degenerate. In the
case of non-degenerate eigenvalues, it can be derived from our GR equations, as can be
shown in the following way.
With the notations of our model (and adding the notation pXY (zi) for the probability
to answer i to question Z, when posed in the order X-then-Y ), the QQ equality (Wang
and Busemeyer 2013, 698) can be written as:
p(a0, b1) + p(a1, b0) = p(b0, a1) + p(b1, a0), (28)
that is,
p(b1|a0)pAB(a0) + p(b0|a1)pAB(a1) = p(a1|b0)pBA(b0) + p(a0|b1)pBA(b1). (29)
Because pXY (z0) + pXY (z1) = 1, it is equivalent to:
p(b1|a0)pAB(a0) + p(b0|a1)[1− pAB(a0)] = p(a1|b0)pBA(b0) + p(a0|b1)[1− pBA(b0)], (30)
which can be rewritten as:
[p(b1|a0)− p(b0|a1)]pAB(a0) + p(b0|a1) = [p(a1|b0)− p(a0|b1)]pBA(b0) + p(a0|b1). (31)
The square brackets are null because of eq. 16 and 17, and the two remaining terms are
equal because of eq. 19. So, the QQ equality is demonstrated from the GR equations when
eigenspaces are not degenerate.
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The GR equations cannot be derived in general from the QQ equality: below, Section 5
gives an example of data which satisfy the QQ equality, but not our GR equations. So
the two tests are not equivalent. They test different things: if a data set does not satisfy
the GR equations, the non-degenerate quantum-like model of Section 2 cannot apply to it
(it remains an open question whether a degenerate model would); if a data set does not
satisfy the QQ equality, the non-degenerate quantum-like model of Section 2 cannot apply
to it, and a degenerate version of it could not either. In other words, a non-degenerate
quantum-like model must satisfy both the GR equations and the QQ equality, and a
degenerate quantum-like model must satisfy the QQ equality.
3.5 Testing the Grand Reciprocity equations
Why test these GR equations? As noted before, the quantum-like literature often
consider models that can be either non-degenerate (answers are represented by rays) or
degenerate (answers are represented by subspaces of any dimension). So, a first reason
to test the GR equations is simplicity: if a non-degenerate model is empirically adequate,
why bother considering a degenerate one? The possibility to have a non-degenerate model
should be settled, and the GR test exactly enables it. Conversely, for models that are
proposed only in a non-degenerate version, the GR equations should be verified with-
out condition, and they provide a decisive test of empirical adequacy. So, in any case,
we suggest that (one of) the GR equation(s) be directly tested experimentally for any
quantum-like model that contains the model presented in Section 2, as a particular case
only or not. “Directly tested”here means that what should be measured are the conditional
probabilities that are present in these equations, or data that enable their computation.
On a more pragmatic ground, the needed data are basic ones, easy to get experimen-
tally. The equations are ready-to-use ones, simpler than the test of double stochasticity
(cf. Section 3.3). More theoretically, each GR equation is equivalent to a fundamental
property of quantum-like models, namely the law of reciprocity. It is not just a conse-
quence of it but it is just the expression of this law for all possible cases in the model.
Testing the GR equations is exactly testing the reciprocity law (testing the QQ equality,
which is only a consequence of the reciprocity law, amounts to another test). The benefit
is that testing the GR equations is more economical: they state that only 4 conditional
probabilities need to be compared to test the law in general. Another reason to test the
GR equations is that a classical model does not verify them; so they can be seen as a test
of the quantum-like character of the data.11
A last point in favor of the test is that, when some empirical data verify the GR
equations, it can be used to define a quantum-like model in a real Hilbert space. Define
p = p(a0|b0); because of the GR equations, any conditional probability p(xi|yj) is either p
or 1− p, and eq. 23 becomes:
T a,b =
(
p 1− p
1− p p
)
. (32)
On the other hand, a model from a real Hilbert space (like in fig. 1) has a change of basis
matrix
µa,b =
(
cos δ − sin δ
sin δ cos δ
)
, (33)
11Indeed, the GR equations are equivalent to the reciprocity law, which is not true in general for classical
models (cf. Section 3.1). Note that classical models which satisfy the GR equations are uninteresting: all
P (xi) and all P (xi|yj) are equal to 0.5.
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and hence a transition matrix
T a,b =
(
cos2 δ sin2 δ
sin2 δ cos2 δ
)
. (34)
Taking δ = arccos(
√
p) enables the real model to account for the data of conditional
probabilities. To put it another way, checking the empirically validity of the GR equations
enables at the same time to define the two bases relatively from one another.
Note that testing the GR equations require that the experiment be conducted in both
question orders (A-then-B and B-then-A). If only one question order is studied, a test
can still be performed, but only on half of the equations. So, whenever a quantum-like
model of the kind depicted here is proposed to account for the results of a succession of
two questions in one order only, then the model should also be tested for the reverse order.
4 Applying the GR equations to non-degenerate (versions
of) existing models
The non-degenerate quantum-like model that we introduced in Section 2 was intended
to serve as a concise presentation for several models from the literature. In this section,
we discuss in detail the relation between our model and existing ones, in order to clarify
whether the latter should verify the GR equations. Recall that satisfying the GR equations
is required in general for non-degenerate models only. So, if an existing model is proposed
in the most general case either as non-degenerate or degenerate, then the GR equations
apply only to the non-degenerate version of the model, not to its degenerate version.
Consider first Conte et al. (2009), who propose a quantum-like model to account for
order effects in mental states during visual perception of ambiguous figures. Their model
can be cast into the lines of our general model: the two dichotomous questions or tests are
also called A and B, and the probabilities of the answers are noted p(A = +), p(A = −),
p(B = +) and p(B = +), corresponding to our p(a0), p(a1), p(b0) and p(b1). The questions
concern visual perception of ambiguous figures, and a vector state, noted here φ (instead
of our ψ) represents the state of consciousness about the perception. It belongs to a
complex Hilbert space, and an answer is represented by a one-dimensional subspace (this
is implicit in their formula (3)). The usual Born rule makes the link with probabilities.
The model also involves a projection postulate: during perception, the “potential” state of
consciousness is collapsed onto “an actual or manifest state of consciousness” (p. 6 and 7).
Note however a slight difference: for Conte et al., the projection of the state arises during
perception of the figure, not during answering a question. But as the latter quickly follows
the former, and as an agent answers a question only once her perception has stabilized,
this does not make any difference in practice. Overall, Conte et al. (2009)’s model matches
our general model in all respects, as it supposes that eigenspaces are of dimension 1. So,
it has to obey the GR equations.
Consider now the model proposed by Wang and Busemeyer (2013), called the QQ
model, which is to account for several types of order effects about judgments on various
topics (politics, sports, society, etc.). The clear presentation of the model in their Section 2,
together with their geometric approach which provides figures similar to ours (in the case
of a real Hilbert space), easily enables to see that it encompasses the non-degenerate model
of Section 2. However, Wang and Busemeyer’s model is more general and allows for an
answer to be represented either with a subspace of dimension 1 (non-degenerate version),
or with a subspace of dimension larger than 1 (degenerate version). The GR equations
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apply only to the former version, as a special case. For instance, they apply to figures 1
and 2 (p. 4 and 5), which represent “a two-dimensional example of the quantum-like model
of question order effects”. Hence, the GR test will exactly fit here the aim we set it in
the introduction: within this general model, specify whether non-degenerate model can be
sufficient, or degenerate model are required.
Wang and Busemeyer’s general model is also at the basis of two other presentations:
in Busemeyer and Bruza’s 2012 book (p. 99–116), and in the review article of Pothos and
Busemeyer (2013). Here too, the model can be non-degenerate or degenerate, and the GR
equations apply with the same conditions: only to the special case of the non-degenerate
version.
Atmanspacher and Ro¨mer (2012, p. 277) make the suggestion that Wang and Buse-
meyer’s model could be extended to mixed states, instead of just pure states. Although
this is an interesting theoretical possibility, it is clear that it cannot be used to avoid the
GR equations, as they are valid for pure as for mixed states (cf. Section 3.2).
Building on the paper of Wang and Busemeyer (2013), Wang et al. (2014) take up
the same quantum-like model for order effect, in order to apply it to a much larger set
of experiments. Here again, answers are supposed to be represented with subspaces of
any dimension. So, the GR equations apply only to the special case of the model in its
non-degenerate version, i. e. when answers are represented with rays as in the model of
Section 2.
5 An empirical glimpse: the GR tests
The previous section has listed several cases in which the GR equations can be tested.
For all cases but Conte et al. (2009), the models have been proposed for any N dimen-
sions, i. e. as either non-degenerate or degenerate. Then, the GR equations can test the
special case of the non-degenerate version of these models, in order to determine whether
this simplest case is sufficient, or if the more general degenerate models are required. This
section is concerned with performing these empirical GR tests. They are done using the
empirical data that are provided in the papers, and which come from either laboratory or
field experiments. To study these empirical data, we divide them into two sets, according
to the topic and the authors: first, in Sections 5.1 to 5.3, we consider the data on exper-
iments about judgment on social or political questions, which enable to test the model
first proposed by Wang and Busemeyer (2013) and considered by Busemeyer and Bruza
(2012), Pothos and Busemeyer (2013), and Wang et al. (2014); second, in Section 5.4, the
data concern an experiment about visual perception, and we test the model proposed by
Conte et al. (2009).
5.1 First data set
Our first data set gathers 72 experiments on order effects, with 70 national surveys
made in the USA plus 2 laboratory experiments:
– 66 national surveys from the Pew Research Center run between 2001 and 2011 about
politics, religion, economic policy and so on, considered in Wang et al. (2014) (noted
in Table 1 as experiments 1 to 66);
– 3 surveys from Moore (2002) concerning Gallup public opinion polls (noted as ex-
periments 67 to 69), which are considered in Wang and Busemeyer (2013) and in
Wang et al. (2014) ;
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Table 1: Questions of the experiments included in the first data set.
1-26 (26 experiments).
A. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bush/Obama is handling
the job as President?
B. All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going
in this country today?
27-41 (15 experiments).
A. Do you approve or disapprove of the job the Republican leaders
in Congress are doing?
B. Do you approve or disapprove of the job the Democratic leaders
in Congress are doing?
42-66 (25 experiments).
These experiments include diverse questions covering topics, from religious
beliefs to support to economic policy.
67.
A. Do you generally think Bill Clinton is honest and trustworthy?
B. Do you generally think Al Gore is honest and trustworthy?
68.
A. Do you think Newt Gingrich is honest and trustworthy?
B. Do you think Bob Dole is honest and trustworthy?
69 and 70.
A. Do you think that only a few or many white people dislike black people?
B. Do you think that only a few or many black people dislike white people?
71.
A. Do you generally favor or oppose affirmative action (AA) programs for
racial minorities?
B. Do you generally favor or oppose affirmative action (AA) programs for
women?
72.
A. Do you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain
a legal abortion if she is married and does not want any more children?
B. Do you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain
a legal abortion if there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby?
– 2 laboratory experiments conducted by Wang and Busemeyer (2013). In the first
experiment, the authors replicate in a laboratory setting the experiment proposed
by Moore (2002) about racial hostility, whereas, in the second one, they replicate
the survey of Wilson et al. (2008) (experiments 70 and 71) ;
– one further Gallup survey reported by Schuman and Presser (1981), also considered
in Wang et al. (2014) (experiment 72).
Figure 4 reports the box plot of the distribution of the total number of subjects per
experiment. The median experiment (741 subjects) is thus supposed to involve half of the
samples (about 370 subjects) in the A-then-B treatment and the remaining half in the
B-then-A treatment. The circle on the left part of the box-plot, outside the left whisker,
pinpoints the two laboratory experiments 70 and 71, which involve the smallest sample,
that is, 228 subjects.
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Figure 4: Distribution of number of subjects per experiment.
Each experiment can be described according to the following common model and no-
tations: two response categorical variables,
– the Bernoulli random variable A ∈ {a0, a1} that represents the possible replies (re-
spectively “yes” or “no”) to the dichotomous question A,
– the Bernoulli random variable B ∈ {b0, b1} that represents the possible replies (re-
spectively “yes” or “no”) to the dichotomous question B,
and one explanatory categorical variables,
– the variable O ∈ {0, 1} that represents the order of appearance of the questions —
0 for the A-then-B order and 1 for the B-then-A order.
Empirically, what is observed is not conditional probabilities like p(bj |ai), but joint fre-
quencies n(ai, bj), that is, the outcome of the counting process of the people responding
i to the first question A and then j to the second question B (the order matters in this
notation: n(bj , ai) refers to the B-then-A experiment). This information can be reported
as a contingency table (Table 2).
Table 2: The contingency table of a generic experiment.
O = 0 O = 1
B = b0 B = b1 B = b0 B = b1
A = a0 n(a0, b0) n(a0, b1) n(b0, a0) n(b1, a0)
A = a1 n(a1, b0) n(a1, b1) n(b0, a1) n(b1, a1)
Validity conditions for hypothesis testing are sensitive to the number of counts — it
is commonly required at least 5 counts for the joint frequencies. To this end, Table 3
reports some statistical information about the distributions of the joint frequencies over
the 72 experiments. In particular, Table 3 focuses on the region of the distributions
corresponding to small values: the rows report the first decile of each distribution (D1 -
10%), the smallest number of subjects occurred in one experiment (min) and the number
of experiments presenting a joint frequency value lower than 5. Summarizing, more than
90% of the experiments have joint frequency values greater or equal to 5, 5 out of 8 joint
frequencies never present values less than 5, and only 6 experiments present for only one
joint frequency a value smaller than 5.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the joint frequencies.
n(a0, b0) n(a0, b1) n(a1, b0) n(a1, b1) n(b0, a0) n(b0, a1) n(b1, a0) n(b1, a1)
D1 33 19 5 47 30 9 17 47
min 6 5 2 19 11 2 3 14
n<5 0 0 4 0 0 1 1 0
5.2 The statistical test
The aim of our statistical study is to study the validity of quantum-like modeling on
order effect experiments by testing the theoretical GR equations (eq. 18 and 19). As they
are equivalent, we focus on the first set of equations,
p(b0|a0) = p(a0|b0) = p(b1|a1) = p(a1|b1). (35)
The conditional probabilities, which are not observable, are estimated by considering con-
ditional relative frequencies f(ai|bj) and f(bj |ai), under the hypothesis that relative fre-
quencies converge to probabilities when the number of people involved in the experiment
tends to infinity. Eq. 35 is equivalent to 6 two-by-two comparisons:
T1: f(b0|a0) = f(a0|b0), (36)
T2: f(b0|a0) = f(b1|a1), (37)
T3: f(b0|a0) = f(a1|b1), (38)
T4: f(a0|b0) = f(b1|a1), (39)
T5: f(a0|b0) = f(a1|b1), (40)
T6: f(b1|a1) = f(a1|b1). (41)
Each test is to compare two conditional relative frequencies y and x, with the null
hypothesis that they are equal.12 From a statistical viewpoint, it is convenient to per-
form an equivalent test in terms of logits: log
(
y
1−y
)
= log
(
x
1−x
)
, or even whether the
natural logarithm of the odds ratio is equal to zero: log(OR) = log
(
x(1−y)
(1−x)y
)
= 0. The
sampling distribution of the log odds ratio X, under the hypothesis of the large sample
approximation, is approximately normal: X ∼ N(log(OR), σ2). Instead of conditional
relative frequencies, the log odds ratio can be easily expressed equivalently in terms of
joint frequencies (cf. Appendix A). For instance, instead of computing the first statistical
test (eq. 36), we can perform the following test:
log(OR) = log
(
n(a0, b0)n(b0, a1)
n(a0, b1)n(b0, a0)
)
= 0. (42)
A continuity correction is also applied, because the normal approximation to the binomial
is used, which is effective in particular for small values of n(ai, bj) or n(bj , ai). The above
test becomes:
log(OR) = log
(
(n(a0, b0) + 0.5)(n(b0, a1) + 0.5)
(n(a0, b1) + 0.5)(n(b0, a0) + 0.5)
)
= 0. (43)
12 Note that there is some arbitrariness in the comparison of the number of a test between two experi-
ments, as it depends on our labeling of both “a/b” and “0/1”. For instance, an experiment which fails T1
would fail T6 if it were labeled differently, and similarly for T2 with T5, and T3 with T4.
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We suppose here that
log(OR)
SElogOR
∼ N(0, 1), (44)
where SElogOR is the standard error of the log odds ratio. It is estimated as the square root
of the sum of the inverse of all the joint frequencies that are considered in the estimation
of the OR:
SElogOR =
√
1
n(a0, b0)
+
1
n(b0, a1)
+
1
n(a0, b1)
+
1
n(b0, a0)
. (45)
Finally, a Bonferroni correction of the type I error is adopted because of the multiple
comparisons (six). Note that this statistical correction is a very conservative one, which
means that it makes false positive rejections much less liable to occur. Concretely, the two-
tailed test implies the null hypothesis of equality between the two conditional frequencies
at the K% significance level is rejected if:
p-value = 2 ·
(
1− CDFstdNorm
(∣∣∣∣ log(OR)SElogOR
∣∣∣∣)) ≤ K100 (46)
where CDFstdNorm is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribu-
tion (mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1). Finally, we test by estimating the adjusted
p-value based on the Bonferroni correction, with
adjusted p-value = 6 · p-value. (47)
5.3 Results on the first data set
Table 7 in Appendix B reports the adjusted p-values of the tests (columns) for each of
the 72 experiments (rows). Recall that only one rejection of the six tests T1-T6 is sufficient
for a non-degenerate quantum-like model to be considered as empirically inadequate. In
this sense, satisfying 5 tests over 6 is not more desirable than satisfying 1 — this is an
all-or-nothing problem, or a “zero-or-non-zero” rejection matter.
First, let us take a general viewpoint on the rejection question. Some summary statis-
tics are provided in Table 4 relative to the distribution of number of test rejections per
experiment. The rejection rate per experiment is high, above 3. The distribution of the
test rejections is highly skewed with respect to a uniform distribution. More than 75%
of the experiments (Q1 - first quartile) reject half or more than half of the 6 tests and
both the median and the mode are equal to 4. The key point is that the first decile
(D1) is equal to 1, that is, more than 90% of the experiments exhibit at least one test
rejection, thus confirming the hypothesis that quantum-like modeling in which one dimen-
sional subspaces (rays) represent answers to questions is not empirically adequate for the
experiments considered in this first data set.
Second, it is possible to have an individual analysis of the experiments: as the last
column of Table 7 (Appendix B) reports the experiment identifier (exp ID) adopted in
Table 1, it is possible to track each question in the ranked-based list of experiments.
For each experimental protocol (laboratory or field experiments, Gallup or Pew Research
Center surveys and different authors), at least one experiment rejects at least one test,
which shows that the result of non-satisfaction is robust also against experimental settings
and questions. For instance, the two laboratory experiments (70 and 71) of the data set
exhibit one test rejection — as they involve the smallest subject pools, one can conjecture
that a higher number of test rejections would occur with more subjects involved.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the number of test rejections per experiment.
mean 3.63
mode 4
Q3 (75%) 5
median 4
Q1 (25%) 3
D1 (10%) 1
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0
1
2
3
4
5
6
sample size
# 
te
st
 re
jec
tio
ns
Figure 5: Scatterplot of the number of test rejections versus the size of the subject pool.
The red triangles pinpoint the 7 experiments with 0 test rejections, the green plus (+) the
two overlapping laboratory experiments.
7 out of the 72 experiments exhibit zero rejections. From a statistical viewpoint,
they all satisfy the validity condition of the test in terms of joint frequency values, that
is more than 5 counts. These experiments have adjusted p-values for all joint frequencies
significantly greater than the 5% significance level. Further investigation would be required
to understand the rationale of the occurrence of no test rejection in these experiments, in
order to exclude spurious statistical arguments. As a first step, Figure 5 plots the number
of test rejections against the size of the subject pool among the experiments. The plot
suggests that low subject pools (say, below 500) tend to reject less tests. It also suggests
that it would be interesting to replicate these 7 experiments with a larger subject pool
(say, 1000 or 1500), to check whether they still verify all the tests.
An important point is however the following one: all 7 polls that do satisfy all GR tests
actually display no order effect (cf. Table 5)13. Yet, it is well-known that data sets that
display no order effect can be accounted for by classical models and that quantum-like
ones are not needed, whether degenerate or not. In other words, in the 7 cases in which
non-degenerate quantum-like models can account for the data, quantum-like models are
13The data that can be obtained from Wang et al. (2014), together with their statistical tests, easily
enable to test the absence of an order effect.
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Table 5: p-values for the order effect tests performed over the 7 experiments that do satisfy
the GR equations. The null hypothesis of absence of order effect cannot be rejected.
exp ID 26 27 42 43 44 47 51
p-value 0.33 0.85 0.17 0.62 0.94 0.18 0.38
actually not needed. Hence, in all the 72 polls considered in this first data set, no non-
degenerate quantum-like model is needed or, when needed, is possible.
Let us now sum up the consequences for each paper. The 6 experiments considered
in Wang and Busemeyer (2013) fail at least one GR test, and thus we can safely say that
they cannot be accounted for with a non-degenerate quantum-like model. For instance,
their 2D figures with rays cannot be considered as representations of the model for their
data, but instead should be thought as an illustrative toy model. Of course, as Wang
and Busemeyer (2013) allow their model to be either degenerate or non-degenerate, there
remains the possibility to account for the data with a degenerate version of the model, but
our GR test is not able to pronounce on that option (cf. Section 6 for a further discussion).
Among the 66 extra experiments considered in Wang et al. (2014), which all come
from the PEW Research Center, a very large majority, 59, fail at least one test and the
same consequence holds: they cannot be accounted for with a non-degenerate quantum-like
model either. Similarly, as Wang et al. (2014) allow their models to be either degenerate or
non-degenerate, we do not claim here that they are wrong but only that the non-degenerate
versions are not empirically adequate for these data — there remains the theoretical pos-
sibility of degenerate versions of the model. 7 experiments remain that can be accounted
for with a non-degenerate model (it would be interesting to replicate these experiments
with a larger number of subjects, to check whether this still holds), but as they display no
order effect, a quantum-like model is actually not needed here and a classical model could
account for them.
5.4 Second data set: Conte et al. (2009)
This section considers the experiments conducted by Conte et al. (2009) about visual
perception. The validity conditions of the statistical test are not fully met because the
number of subjects per experiment is around 60, posing the issue of statistical significance
for such a small sample. In particular, the statistical requirement of at least 5 counts
for each joint frequency is not always met in this data set. However, for the sake of
completeness, the statistical tests are reported here.14
4 distinct experiments are performed, each comprising two treatments involving a pop-
ulation of 19 to 22 year-old students. The first treatment of each experiment involves a
group of subjects exposed only to test A, whereas the second one to test B and “soon
after” to test A. Only the second (52 subjects) and the third (64 subjects) experiments
implement the same visual task (subjects have to look at ambiguous figures of animal),
but exchanging tests A and B. Therefore, by considering only the treatment/group 2 of
these two experiments, the full GR equations can be tested.
14An experiment similar to the one reported in Conte et al. (2009) is mentioned in Khrennikov (2010,
p. 79-86). However, we prefer to focus on the former because in the latter (i) the number of subjects
involved is still lower and (ii) as no reverse order in the questions is considered, data is lacking to fully test
the GR equations.
21
Table 6: Experiments of Conte et al. (2009), adjusted p-values for the 6 tests. The
rejection is highlighted at the 5% significance level.
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
4.300 2.404 0.029 3.782 0.079 0.268
Table 6 reports the adjusted p-values for the 6 tests. As the third test is rejected
at the 5% significance level, we can conclude that a quantum-like non-degenerate model
does not adequately fit the experimental data.15 Here, too, the small size of the sample
is associated with a small number of test rejections. A more rigorous empirical test of
the GR equations would require a larger subject pool. Anyway, as the model proposed by
Conte et al. (2009) is supposed to be only non-degenerate, we can already say that it fails
and cannot be said to be empirically adequate for the reported data.
6 Discussion: degenerate models and the future of quantum-
like research on order effect
This paper has been concerned with the quantum-like models that have been recently
proposed to account for question order effect. So far, many of them have been proposed
in the most general way, either as non-degenerate or as degenerate, while it was suggested
that degenerate models would be probably required. We settled on the project to document
this empirically, by testing whether the non-degenerate versions of the models could be
sufficient. To this end, we have advocated the test of novel predictions of the models,
which are equivalent to the law of reciprocity: the GR equations. After performing the
test against available data, the result is quite clear: non-degenerate models are not an
option, being not empirically adequate or not needed. This confirms the suggestions from
the literature (cf. footnote 1) that they are too simple to be empirically adequate and
should be considered as toy models only.
As we have also made it clear, our results do not rule out all quantum-like models:
degenerate versions of the model, to which the GR equations do not apply, have not
been tested here. So, a natural line of research is now to turn to degenerate quantum-like
models, where answers are represented by sub-spaces of dimension 2 or larger. For instance,
this is the solution adopted by Busemeyer, Wang and Lambert-Mogiliansky (2009): after
showing that a 2D quantum-like model is not doubly stochastic (which implies that it does
not respect our GR equations), they switch to a 4D model.16
A strong suggestion in favor of this line of research comes from the following fact.
While the GR equations are violated on a vast majority of experimental data sets, the
QQ equality is experimentally verified in all these cases (for the data considered in Wang
and Busemeyer 2013 and Wang et al. 2014). Recall that the QQ equality is valid for
quantum-like models of the kind considered here, whether they are degenerate or not (cf.
Section 3.4). It is just an empirical prediction they all have to satisfy. Also, Wang and
15As the GR equations are not satisfied, neither is double-stochasticity in both senses (cf. Section 3.3).
Actually, the fact that the data of Conte et al. (2009) fail to follow double-stochasticity is noted by
Khrennikov (2010, 107 and 114).
16However, note that their 4D model is not just a degenerate version of their 2D model, as it adds some
time evolution of the state between the two questions. On another question than order effect, namely
the account for the conjunction fallacy, Franco (2009) considers a non-degenerate 2D model only, while
Busemeyer et al. (2011) considers n-dimensional ones, which can be degenerate.
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Busemeyer (2009, Section 6) have argued that other kinds of models, like Bayesian or
Markov ones, do not generally satisfy the QQ equality, which gives good grounds to think
that some quantum-like model could account for the data (cf. also Wang et al. 2014). As
our present results exclude non-degenerate models, the hopes are now on the degenerate
ones. Overall, the following tests might be made on a data set of question order effect:
1) test the QQ equality; if it is violated, no quantum-like model (of the sort considered
in this paper) can account for it; if it is not violated, it gives good grounds to think (but
does not prove) that a degenerate or non-degenerate quantum-like model can account for
it; 2) test the GR equations; if they are violated, no non-degenerate quantum-like model
can account for the data; if they are not, one can.
However, in our view, the route of degenerate models is not necessarily an easy one, and
we would like to recommend that some research be done about their empirical adequacy.
First, degenerate models are not a priori freed from any constraint, and this is the point
on which we would like to insist very much. One should not consider that, when a data
set satisfies the QQ equality and violates the GR equations, the solution safely lies in
a degenerate model. The moral of our paper should be taken as insisting on the need
to empirically test all quantum-like models. Note that we do not just call for running
more experiments; all the tests we have done here have been made on available data, and
could have been made beforehand. Importantly, empirical adequacy does not only mean
applying to a vast number of empirical cases, but also, for one experimental case, making
correct predictions in all respects, and for that it is crucial to pull the threads of all possible
predictions. Here, we have found simple and ready-to-use tests for non-degenerate models,
and we suspect that some other constraints apply to degenerate models. Research is
urgently needed here to find general tests. At least, when a degenerate model is proposed
to account for some features of a data set, we suggest that all parameters be specified
and that serious efforts be directed towards empirically testing this model by unveiling
experimental predictions that lie outside the feature one intends to explain, so as to prevent
later “bad surprises”.
A promising way to test degenerate models has already been indicated in the end of
Section 3.2: degenerate eigenspaces may actually encompass non-degenerate and more
fundamental eigenspaces, that correspond to fundamental elementary questions — to be
identified. If such elementary questions exist, and the quantum-like literature seems not
to have doubts on that, all degenerate models can actually be tested against generalized
GR equations for these more fundamental questions. In other words, our GR test for non-
degenerate models can possibly apply at a fundamental level for all degenerate models,
provided elementary questions are identified.17 We are ready to admit, however, that the
fundamental dimensions and the corresponding tests can be hard to uncover.
The need to specify the elementary dimensions of the Hilbert space for degenerate
models is also required by other arguments. Introducing dimensions of degeneracy should
be justified, so as not to be accused of being just ad hoc. As Pothos and Busemeyer (2013,
p. 215) write, “Dimensionality is not a free parameter”. In quantum physics for instance,
degeneration is usually theoretically justified with a symmetry in the Hamiltonian, and
the degeneration can be experimentally removed by introducing some factor that was
not present (e.g., the spin degeneration is removed by introducing a magnetic field). For
quantum-like judgment models as well, one should provide a similar theoretical justification
and an experimental way of removing the degeneration. In this respect, the idea that there
17These generalized GR equations for elementary questions might help to establish the constraints that
degenerate models must satisfy in general, but for non-elementary questions, that have been discussed in
the above paragraph.
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exists fundamental questions and rays will certainly be helpful; the work is then to find
out which fundamental dimensions are hidden behind the degenerate eigenspace.
Overall, all this argues against the view that switching to degenerate models when
GR equations are violated would be a natural or unquestioned move to have and that it
would solve all problems. Instead, supplementary dimensions should be justified, probably
with elementary questions, and other predictions of the model than those one intends to
account for should be investigated and tested, possibly with generalized GR equations.
Beyond degenerate quantum-like models in the flavor of the model presented in Sec-
tion 2, there are also other possible lines of research around quantum ideas. For instance,
Khrennikov has proposed to consider hyperbolic Hilbert space models, instead of complex
ones like in this paper. Hyperbolic models enable probabilities that are not constrained in
the same way, and can account for some data that are out of reach for complex quantum-
like models (see Khrennikov 2010 for a synthesis). Also, other tools than projectors, like
POVMs, could be considered; or other axioms of standard quantum-like models, like the
projection postulate or the Born rule, could be abandoned or modified.
To conclude, quantum-like models have brought to discussion many provoking and
seminal ideas, such as the hypotheses that judgments or preferences might be undetermined
instead of only unknown, or that non-classical probabilities could be considered. We have
insisted on the need to empirically test existing models for question order effect, and our
results suggest that non-degenerate quantum-like models should be considered more as
toy models than as empirically adequate models, in accordance with suggestions from the
literature, and that future investigations should focus on degenerate models. In spite of
the potential difficulties that such models face, there is plenty of room for future research
in the area, and besides our results can be taken as posing a challenge liable to trigger a
revival of the discussion on quantum-like models of various sorts.
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A Testing the equality of two conditional relative frequen-
cies
The statistical test is to compare two conditional relative frequencies y and x, with the
null hypothesis that they are equal. The test is therefore
y = x, (48)
where both y and x are observed conditional relative frequencies.
Testing equation 48 is equivalent to test
log
(
y
1− y
)
= log
(
x
1− x
)
,
given that y and x are not equal to zero.
Alternatively, we can formulate the test in terms of the log odds ratio (OR)
log(OR) = log
(
y
1−y
x
1−x
)
= 0.
Now let us suppose that we want to test
f(a0|b0) = f(b0|a0). (49)
We can thus test the following condition:
log
(
f(a0|b0)
1− f(a0|b0)
)
= log
(
f(b0|a0)
1− f(b0|a0)
)
,
or
log
(
f(a0|b0)
f(a1|b0)
)
= log
(
f(b0|a0)
f(b1|a0)
)
.
By expressing the conditional relative frequencies in terms of joint frequencies, that is,
f(a0|b0) = n(b0, a0)
n(b0, ·) , f(b0|a0) =
n(a0, b0)
n(a0, ·) , . . .
being n(b0, ·) and n(a0, ·) the marginal frequencies of B and A, respectively, we obtain
log
(
n(b0, a0)
n(b0, ·)
n(b0, ·)
n(b0, a1)
)
= log
(
n(a0, b0)
n(a0, ·)
n(a0, ·)
n(a0, b1)
)
,
or simplifying
log
(
n(b0, a0)n(a0, b1)
n(b0, a1)n(a0, b0)
)
= 0. (50)
We can thus test indifferently eq. 49 or 50.
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B Results of the tests for the first data set
Table 7: Adjusted p-values of the 6 tests for the 72 experi-
ments of the first data set. The rejection is highlighted at the
5% significance level. The 7th column reports the number of
rejections (#R) at the 5% significance level, and the 8th one
reports the experiment ID (cf. Table 1).
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 #R at 5% exp ID
0.011 0.000 4.718 0.057 0.023 0.000 4 1
0.000 0.004 2.652 5.163 0.000 0.001 4 2
0.135 0.975 0.321 3.828 0.000 0.033 2 3
0.000 0.000 0.113 0.191 0.078 0.000 3 4
0.000 0.000 1.653 1.151 0.008 0.000 4 5
0.000 0.000 4.577 2.138 0.000 0.000 4 6
0.000 0.000 1.400 0.023 0.006 0.000 5 7
0.000 0.000 0.001 1.279 0.180 0.001 4 8
0.021 0.000 0.181 0.024 1.682 0.000 4 9
0.001 0.000 0.274 0.006 0.096 0.000 4 10
0.749 0.000 0.066 0.000 2.517 0.000 3 11
0.000 0.000 3.319 0.607 0.000 0.000 4 12
0.000 0.000 0.102 1.728 0.000 0.000 4 13
0.000 0.000 1.506 5.892 0.000 0.000 4 14
0.000 0.000 0.002 1.050 0.000 0.000 5 15
0.000 0.000 0.032 0.033 0.000 0.000 6 16
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 6 17
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 6 18
0.000 0.000 0.004 0.019 0.000 0.000 6 19
0.000 0.000 0.535 0.082 0.001 0.000 4 20
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 6 21
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.354 0.000 5 22
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.000 6 23
0.000 0.000 0.107 0.037 0.000 0.000 5 24
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 6 25
4.172 4.213 1.406 2.708 2.720 0.728 0 26
5.811 4.289 1.423 4.154 1.408 2.316 0 27
4.261 0.150 0.020 0.450 0.096 3.540 1 28
1.557 0.039 0.072 0.001 0.003 4.611 3 29
5.368 0.026 0.070 0.001 0.001 2.092 3 30
0.135 1.870 0.427 0.005 0.000 2.286 2 31
0.912 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.896 4 32
0.011 2.285 0.002 0.068 0.000 0.000 4 33
0.012 1.420 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.021 5 34
0.580 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038 4 35
1.093 1.382 0.041 0.035 0.000 0.427 3 36
2.913 0.073 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.107 3 37
0.179 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.062 4 38
1.373 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.482 4 39
4.564 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.084 4 40
Continued on next page
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T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 #R at 5% exp. ID
1.936 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.716 4 41
5.188 1.343 1.723 1.649 2.101 5.229 0 42
2.651 5.452 5.452 2.212 2.212 6.000 0 43
3.965 4.249 3.554 2.414 1.999 5.064 0 44
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.546 0.055 4 45
0.000 0.000 0.860 4.837 0.000 0.000 4 46
0.050 0.181 3.527 4.402 0.523 1.039 0 47
0.004 0.044 2.358 4.837 0.036 0.212 3 48
0.005 0.347 2.185 1.999 0.103 1.537 1 49
0.000 4.281 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5 50
1.939 1.910 3.856 5.503 3.163 3.307 0 51
0.141 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.377 4 52
0.003 4.472 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.023 5 53
0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 5 54
5.498 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.845 4 55
0.013 0.125 3.852 2.282 0.046 0.360 2 56
0.000 0.000 1.843 4.369 0.000 0.000 4 57
1.922 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043 5 58
0.001 3.012 0.389 0.026 0.000 0.179 3 59
0.000 1.570 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 5 60
0.000 0.000 0.128 4.872 0.000 0.000 4 61
0.003 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.608 2.054 4 62
0.000 0.000 5.106 3.456 0.000 0.000 4 63
0.000 0.000 0.000 3.333 0.012 0.000 5 64
0.021 4.789 0.065 0.001 0.000 0.039 4 65
0.002 0.466 0.027 0.135 0.000 0.000 4 66
0.000 0.000 2.771 0.024 0.011 0.000 5 67
0.000 0.000 2.909 0.075 0.000 0.000 4 68
0.020 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 3.581 5 69
4.481 0.130 0.709 0.038 0.293 2.110 1 70
0.511 0.008 4.589 0.332 1.616 0.115 1 71
0.016 0.000 0.010 0.014 0.654 0.479 4 72
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